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SPARE THE ROD, SPOIL THE CHILD? A 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR RECENT 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT PROPOSALS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When eighteen-year-old Ohio native Michael Fay was 
sentenced to six lashes in a Singapore prison for vandalism, 
the severity of his sentence drew national attention, and re-
newed the debate about the role of corporal punishment in the 
criminal justice system.1 The difference between sentencing in 
Singapore and in the United States was dramatic: in Ohio, 
Fay could have received a maximum sentence of sixty days in 
jail, a $500 fine, and restitution to the property owners.2 Al-
though Fay's original sentence was reduced from six lashes to 
four after an appeal by President Clinton,3 the experience was 
no less painful for the prisoner. After being released, Fay stat-
ed: "I felt a deep burning sensation throughout my body, real 
pain. The flesh was ripped open.'" 
Reaction to Fay's sentence split between those praising 
1. Michael Elliot, et at, Crime and Punishment, NEWSWEEK, April 18, 1994, 
at 18. 
2. OHIO. REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.21 (Anderson 1993). 
3. Teen's Caning Reduced to 4 Lashes, CmCAGO TRIBUNE, May 4, 1994, at 7. 
The government of Singapore, citing its close relationship with the United States, 
yielded to President Clinton's request for clemency only after determining that 
rejecting Clinton's appeal would "show an unhelpful disregard for the president 
and the domestic pressures on him on this issue." Id. (quotations omitted). 
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Singapore for its intolerance of petty crime, and those con-
vinced Fay had been cruelly punished for a minor offense.5 
Fifty percent of Americans polled disapproved of the sentence, 
but a surprising 38 percent did approve, and those in the mi-
nority were far more vocal than the opposition.6 A poll con-
ducted jointly by CNN and Time in April, 1994, found 46 per-
cent of those surveyed supported Fay's punishment.7 When 
asked, most Americans cited their frustration over rising crime 
rates as the source of their support of the sentence imposed on 
Fay.s 
Sensing a shift in the public mood toward more harsh 
punishments for juveniles, politicians reacted to a perceived 
opportunity. In California, Assemblyman Mickey Conroy drew 
national headlines9 when he introduced Assembly Bill 150;10 
5. Michael Elliot, et aI, Crime and Punishment, NEWSWEEK, April 18, 1994, at 
18. 
6. [d. 
7. Kendall Anderson, Backers of Paddling Want Teen Offenders to Feel the 
Pain, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 6, 1994, at 1A. 
8. [d. Public fears over rising juvenile crime may not be unwarranted. In 
1983, 1,481,071 juveniles (under 18 years of age) were arrested for crimes ranging 
from murder to curfew and loitering violations. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, 1993. In 1992, the FBI reported 1,738,180 juvenile 
arrests, an increase of 17.4 percent over ten years. [d. These numbers do show 
some improvements, however, as juveniles represented only 16.3 of all arrests, 
down from 17.2 percent in 1983. [d. 
9. Eric Bailey, Paddling Bill Puts Conroy in Hot Seat of National Debate, Los 
ANGELES TIMES, June 23, 1994, at AI. In the weeks following introduction of his 
legislation, Assemblyman Conroy appeared on the BBC, CNN, "Oprah," "20/20," "60 
Minutes," and more than 20 talk radio shows. [d. 
10. Assembly Bill 150, Cal. Leg. 1993-94 Special Session "A" (proposed May 
23, 1994) !hereinafter AB 150). AB 150 would have amended the section 726.5 of 
the California Welfare and Institution Code to read: 
(a) In addition to any other punishment, any minor who 
is adjudged a ward of the court pursuant to Section 602 
for an act of graffiti to any public or private property 
may be punished by paddling. The court shall consider 
the age, condition, and disposition of the minor and all 
the attending and surrounding circumstances in determin-
ing whether and to what extent paddling shall be order-
ed. Paddling, if ordered, shall be administered in the 
courtroom at a time set by the court no less than 72 
hours nor more than 14 days after the minor is adjudged 
a ward of the court for an act of graffiti. Paddling shall 
be administered by a parent of the minor. However, if the 
parent declines to administer the paddling, or if the court 
determines that the parent has not administered a satis-
2
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legislation that would punish California youths adjudicated in 
juvenile court for graffiti vandalism with strikes from a wood-
en paddle.ll Similar efforts appeared in Louisiana,12 Cincin-
nati, Ohio,13 Sacramento, California,14 San Antonio, Texas,15 
and St. Louis, Missouri. 16 Although none of the proposals suc-
ceeded,t7 these efforts renewed the debate over what role, if 
any, corporal punishmenes should play in the American jus-
tice system. 
This comment will highlight some of the legal concerns 
factory paddling, a bailiff shall administer the paddling. 
Id. 
11. Id. 
12. House Bill 38, La. Leg. 23rd Extraordinary Session (introduced June 6, 
1994, failed passage June 24, 1994). H.B. 38 Oater incorporated within La. H.B. 
431c) would have amended Article 897 of the Louisiana Children's Code to read: 
<0 After adjudication of any felony-grade delinquent act, 
the court may commit the child to the temporary custody 
of the department of public safety and corrections for the 
purpose of and until the execution of the judge's order 
requiring the department to paddle the adjudicated delin-
quent by a specified number of strokes, which disposition 
shall be included within the order of commitment and the 
judgment of disposition in accordance with Article 903. 
Id. Louisiana Children's Code Article 899 would also have been amended to in-
clude paddling as a sentence for misdemeanors. Id. 
13. Kendall Anderson, Backers of Paddling Want Teen Offenders to Feel the 
Pain, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 6, 1994, at 1A 
14. Bill Lindelof, Pane Urges Paddling for Graffiti, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 16, 
1994 at Bl. Sacramento City Councilman Josh Pane called for public paddling of 
graffiti vandals in a report on the city's graffiti problem. Id. 
15. Richard Stewart, San Antonio offteial seeks law with sting; Paddling teens 
for graffiti urged, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 29, 1994, at A19. San Antonio Coun-
cilman Lyle Larson called for corporal punishment of teen-age graffiti artists. His 
proposal was similar to California's A.B. 150. Id. 
16. Lawmakers in U.S. Propose Paddling, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 26, 1994, at 
38. A committee of alderman in St. Louis refused to second a resolution seeking a 
legal opinion on whether canings were legal. Id. The ordinance's author, Freeman 
Bosley Sr., was undaunted by the council defeat. In November, 1994, he and the 
Committee for Legalization of Public Paddling began collecting signatures for a 
ballot measure proposing paddling as a punishment for juvenile graffiti offenders. 
Twenty-thousand signatures are needed to put the measure on the ballot. Thom 
Gross, Campaign Under Way to Adopt Paddling, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 
10, 1994, at B3. 
17. Ann Bancroft, Assembly Panel Rejects Paddling of Graffiti Artists, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, August 11, 1994, at A21. 
18. "Corporal punishment: Physical punishment as distinguished from pecuni-
ary punishment or a fine; any kind of punishment of or inflicted on the body." 
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1983). 
3
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raised by legislative proposals advocating the introduction of 
corporal punishment into the American juvenile court. The 
comment will begin by reviewing the historical use of corporal 
punishment, contrasting the decline of corporal punishment in 
the criminal justice system with its continued use in the school 
system. Although the United States Supreme Court has held 
that school children are not entitled to the protection of the 
Eighth Amendment when they are paddled,19 the comment 
will contend that ordering juvenile offenders to corporal pun-
ishment must be subject to review under the Eighth20 and 
Fourteenth21 Amendments ,of the United States Constitution. 
Under such scrutiny, paddling in juvenile court violates not 
only the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and un-
usual punishment, but also infringes upon a juvenile's right to 
bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment. illtimate-
ly, the comment will suggest policy considerations that should 
have accompanied the latest debate over an old subject: corpo-
ral punishment. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Since the earliest form of civil society, a variety of brutal 
punishments have been visited upon criminals, most of them 
painful and humiliating.22 While the most barbaric punish-
ments slowly disappeared,23 one method-floggin~4-thrived 
as a means of preserving discipline in the family, domestic, 
military, and academic spheres.25 Flogging had an especially 
long life span, from primitive times well into the early part of 
the 20th Century.28 
19. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." [d. 
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person with-
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." [d. 
22. GRAEME NEWMAN, THE PuNISHMENT RESPONSE 28-49 (1978). Among those 
forms of punishment facing the convicted criminal: stoning, branding, mutilation, 
and the stocks and pillory. [d. 
23. [d. at 269. 
24. "Flog: to beat or strike with a rod or whip." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976). For the purposes of this comment, whipping and 
flogging are interchangeable terms. 
25. HARRy ELMER BARNES, THE STORY OF PuNISHMENT 55-56 (2d ed. 1972). 
26. [d. 
4
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Few were spared the pain of the lash in the years prior to 
the 19th century reform of the American and English criminal 
justice systems.27 Slaves, women, and children were routinely 
flogged, often at the hand of the master of the house.28 Par-
ents retained the right to use corporal punishment on their 
children so long as they did not use excessive force,29 and chil-
dren were routinely caned or whipped in schoo1.30 Slaves, ow-
ing to their status as chattel, suffered some of the most brutal 
punishments.31 Women also faced physical punishment, from 
their husbands, fathers, or the state.32 
While slaves, women, and children were often subjected to 
corporal punishment in a relatively arbitrary manner, soldiers 
were systematically and repeatedly flogged until the mid-
1800'S.33 In 1775, the United States Congress authorized 
whipping aboard American vessels, permitting commanders to 
strike up to twelve lashes on enlisted men.34 Soon, naval 
court martials adopted the whip as a punishment, while the 
U.S. Navy continuously expanded the number of crimes pun-
ishable by flogging.35 In 1800, a sailor could expect to receive 
up to 100 lashes if convicted by court martial of a single infrac-
tion.36 The British Army often used whipping as a form of 
military discipline, logging up to 17,000 lashes per month in 
India in 1812.37 
27. The American system of criminal justice prior to the late 1800's closely 
relied on its British roots. While both systems experienced reform at roughly the 
same time, this background discussion will look to the development of corporal 
punishment theories in both countries. 
28. NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 55-56. 
29. MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 10 (1984). 
30. NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 65. A mutiny by students at Eton in 1832 led 
to the flogging of 80 boys. A similar revolt in 1818 required two companies of 
troops with flXed bayonets to quell the disturbance. [d. 
, 31. [d. at 58. One report of a slave punishment is illustrative: a young slave 
girl was whipped, had sealing wax dripped into her wounds, was whipped again 
and kicked in the face. Her crime was burning her master's waffles. [d. at 59. 
32. [d. at 56. 
33. GLENN, supra note 29, at 9. 
34. [d. 
35. [d. at 9-10. Among those offenses punishable by whipping were cruelty, 
fraud, use of profanity, and drunkenness. 
36. [d. 
37. NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 27. 
5
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Corporal punishment's demise is rooted in the new philos-
ophies that swept across Europe and the American colonies 
between 1500 and 1800. These philosophies shifted the focus 
away from punishing crimes through the infliction of physical 
pain, toward the use of prisons and rehabilitative methods.38 
Italian philosopher Cesare Beccaria sounded an early call to 
reform with the 1764 publication of On Crimes and Punish-
ment.39 This treatise suggested the novel idea40 that instead 
of just causing the offender to suffer for his crimes, criminal 
punishment should also seek to deter others from committing 
crimes.41 "It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them," 
Beccaria wrote.42 "This is the ultimate end of every good legis-
lation."43 
Beccaria's work stimulated others to join the crusade to 
reform the criminal justice system, notably the Utilitarian 
movement led by British philosopher Jeremy Bentham.44 The 
Utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest num-
ber of people led to their belief that a penalty should impose a 
level of pain in excess of the pleasure derived from committing 
the crime.46 Applied to criminal law, the prospect of deriving 
more pain than pleasure from the commission of a crime would 
theoretically act as a sufficient deterrent to any potential crim-
ina1.46 A fair criminal punishment, in the eyes of Utilitarians, 
would thus be measured not only by society's desire for simple 
retribution against the offender, but would also take into ac-
count the extent to which the crime inflicted pain upon society 
38. BARNES, supra note 25, at 94. 
39. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PuNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., 
1963). 
40. Although Beccaria was not the first to suggest an alternative to the abuses 
of the criminal justice system, he was the first philosopher to effectively apply the 
emerging theories of humanitarianism, enlightenment, and rationalism to the crim-
inal law. BARNES, supra note 25, at 97. In a time marked by secret accusations, 
inadequate provisions for defending the accused, and the common use of torture, 
Beccaria's essay was revolutionary for its day. [d. 
41. Id. at 97-98. 
42. BECCARIA, supra note 39, at 93. 
43. Id. 
44. For a general discussion of Utilitarian theory, see C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT 
AND PuNISHMENT 7-37 (1987). 
45. BARNES, supra note 25, at 101. 
46. [d. 
6
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as a whole.47 
Utilitarian theories of punishment found practical applica-
tion in the British and American prison reform movements of 
the 1800's.48 Until his death in 1818, Sir Samuel Romilly, a 
British lawyer, tirelessly worked toward the reform of the 
English criminal code, which at one point featured some 222 
capital crimes.49 Sir James Mackintosh and Sir Thomas 
Foxwell Buxton continued Romilly's cause, urging Sir Robert 
Peel to take legislative action.50 Peel's work led to a complete 
overhaul of the British criminal code between 1820 and 
1861,51 an accomplishment that saw the substitution of im-
prisonment and treatment for barbarism in punishment. 52 
American prison reformers of the era before the Civil War 
aggressively campaigned against the use of corporal punish-
ment on convicts, and pushed for improved prison condi-
tions.53 Significant reform of the American prison system be-
tween 1780 and 1830, especially in Pennsylvania and New 
York, focused attention on the beneficial uses of imprisonment 
and turned away from painful physical punishments.54 De-
spite a brief return to corporal punishment in the latter half of 
the Eighteenth Century as a response to prison overcrowd-
ing,55 the practice became the subject of greater scrutiny and 
abuse of prisoners subsided in most American prisons during 
the 1850's.56 
An American movement against the use of corporal pun-
ishment outside the prisons began to spread in the 1820's, 
gaining momentum by the 1840's.57 Religious leaders, educa-
tors and the medical establishment began to speak out against 
47. NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 162·64. 
48. BARNES, supra note 25, at 101. 
49. [d. at 101·02. 
50. [d at 102. 
51. [d. 
52. [d. at 102·03. 
53. GLENN, supra note 29, at 13. 
54. BARNES, supra note 25, at 111·12. 
55. GLENN, supra note 29, at 10. Between 1843 and 1847, Sing Sing Prison in 
New York doled out 2,456 lashes. [d. 
56. [d. at 134·36. 
57. GLENN, supra note 29, at 12-13. 
7
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the excessive and sometimes barbaric use of physical sanc-
tions.58 A growing public distaste for corporal punishment led 
to the further restriction or outright abolition of corporal pun-
ishment against soldiers, students and juvenile offenders.59 
Congress acted on the federal level to restrict the use of whip-
ping in the United States Navy, and school regulations were 
modified to reflect the movement away from corporal punish-
ment.60 Young offenders were no longer subject to whippings 
and other degradations such as shackling, but were instead 
diverted to the new institution of the juvenile court.61 
Despite the general trend away from corporal punishment, 
whipping laws remained on the books as late as 1972.62 Al-
though the practice was almost completely discontinued by 
1952,63 Delaware approved whipping as a punishment for cer-
tain crimes as late as 1963.64 The Delaware Supreme Court 
recognized that corporal punishment was generally a discredit-
ed practice, but left to the legislature the question of whether 
the punishment violated Delaware's Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause.65 While Delaware was a late hold-out, no 
jurisdiction hands out corporal punishment as a criminal sen-
tence today.66 
III. WHEN PUNISHMENT IS NOT: THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 
In the United States, corporal punishment survives PrI-
58. [d. at 11. 
59. [d. at 146 
60.Id. 
61. CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 7-23 (3d ed. 1991). 
62. Tom Troy, Castle Opposes Whipping Post, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 
Feb. 7, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ArcNws File. 
63. Id. 
64. See State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514 (Del. 1963). 
65. Id. 
66. Tom Kuntz, Beyond Singapore: Corporal Punishment, A to Z, NEW YORK 
TIMES, June 26, 1994, at E5. This comment does not address the current use of 
corporal punishment around the world. Amnesty International has documented 
numerous human rights abuses involving the use of corporal punishment, such as 
the British computer technician in Qatar who sold alcohol to a Qatari and was 
flogged with 50 lashes. [d. In South Africa, more than 75,000 people have been 
flogged for crimes ranging from murder to sedition. Id. 
8
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marily in the school system.S7 Twenty-two states expressly 
permit corporal punishment in schools,s8 while some states 
provide a measure of discretion to the local school boards69 or 
school administrators to determine if physical punishment is 
necessary.70 Nearly 900,000 students received some form of 
corporal punishment in the 1987-88 school year,71 although 
parents, teachers and a wide variety of organizations disparage 
the practice.72 
Proponents of corporal punishment in juvenile court have 
drawn support73 from Ingraham v. Wright,74 a 1977 U.S. Su-
preme Court case where the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment was intended to apply to criminal punishments 
67. For a discussion of school corporal punishment, see Jerry R. Parkinson, 
Federal Court Treatment of Corporal Punishment In Public Schools: Jurisprudence 
that is Literally Shocking to the Conscience, 39 S.D. L. REV. 276 (1994). 
68. ALA. CODE § 16-1-14 (Michie Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843 
(West Supp. 1994); ALAsKA STAT. ANN. § 232.27 (1993); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-18-
505 (Michie 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. § 14-701 (Michie Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 232.27 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-730 (Michie Supp. 1994); HAw. 
REV. STAT. § 296-12 (Michie Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 33-1224 (Michie Supp. 
1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-5-2 (Michie Supp. 1994); 704 Ky. ADMIN. REG. 
7:055; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:223 (West Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 
20, § 4009 (West Supp. 1994); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 380.1312 (West Supp. 
1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 391.270 (Michie 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.3 
(Michie Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § ll5C-390 (Michie 1994); Omo REv. CODE 
ANN. § 3319.41 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-ll4 (West Supp. 1994); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-260 (Law. Co-op 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 13-32-
2 (Michie Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-6-4103 (Michie Supp. 1994). 
69. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § ll5C-390 (Michie 1994). 
70. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-5-2 (Michie 1994) (giving teachers "the 
right to take any action which is then reasonably necessary to carry out, or to 
prevent an interference with, the educational function of which he is then in 
charge"); ALAsKA STAT. § 11.81.430 (1989) (allows a teacher, if authorized by 
school regulations and the principal of the school, to "use reasonable and appropri-
ate nondeadly force upon a student"). While not specifically authorizing the use of 
corporal punishment, the Attorney General of Alaska has issued an opinion stating 
corporal punishment is "probably" legal if used reasonably. Jan. 30, 1986, Ope 
Att'y Gen. 
71. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 1988 Elementary 
and Secondary School Civil Rights Survey, app. B., at 1 (cited in Jon M. Bylsma, 
Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law; N. Education: Hands Off! New 
North Carolina General Statutes Section 115C·390 Allows Local School Boards to 
Ban Corporal Punishment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 2058, 2059 (1992». 
72. Parkinson, supra note 67, at 278-79. 
73. Memorandum from the Assembly Republican Caucus of the California Leg-
islature (on file with author). The memorandum, provided by Assemblyman 
Conroy's office, cited Ingraham in support of A.B. 150. 
74. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
9
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alone, and thus did not apply to paddling imposed on students 
as a disciplinary or corrective measure.76 The Ingraham Court 
also found that while a liberty interest is implicated by a phys-
ical punishment in the school setting, only minimal procedures 
are necessary to satisfy the due process guarantee of the Four-
teenth Amendment.76 Relying on Ingraham as grounds for 
introducing corporal punishment into juvenile court, however, 
fails to consider the significant differences between punish-
ment in the school setting and punishment in the juvenile 
court. 
The petitioners in Ingraham, junior high school students 
living in Florida, challenged a Florida regulation authorizing 
limited corporal punishmene7 in Florida schools, so long as 
the punishment was not "degrading or unduly severe,"7S and 
the teacher obtained prior approval of the school principal. 79 
The application of the punishment with a one-half inch thick 
paddle was sometimes extreme: one student suffered severe 
bruises, while another lost the use of his arm for one week.so 
The district court dismissed the case,S1 but a three-judge pan-
el of the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the punish-
ment violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.s2 
Upon rehearing, the court of appeals, sitting en bane, affirmed 
the district court's original dismissal of the case. S3 
75. Id. at 669. 
76. Id. at 676-82. Florida permitted paddling after the teacher and principal 
decided that corporal punishment was necessary under the circumstances. The 
teacher or principal is limited only to the extent the common law provides damag-
es or criminal prosecution for excessive force. Id. at 676-77. The petitioners also 
sought to impose a hearing before corporal punishment was administered, but the 
Court rejected this requirement because it would "significantly burden the use of 
corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure." Id. at 680. 
77. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.27 (West Supp. 1993). 
78. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 655 n.6. 
79.Id. 
80. Id. at 657. 
81. Id. at 658. 
82. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974) (Ingraham n, reu'd and 
remanded, Ingraham v. Wright, No. 73-2708 (S.D. Fla. 1975). 
83. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (Ingraham W, affg 
Ingraham v. Wright, No. 73-2708 (S.D. Fla. 1975). In Ingraham I, the District 
Court dismissed the action, but the court of appeals reversed. Ingraham I, 498 
F.2d at 251. The decision upon remand was not published, and the court of ap-
peals in Ingraham II appeared to rely on the district court's original findings 
without considering the hearing upon remand. Ingraham II, 525 F.2d at 911. 
10
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The Supreme Court affirmed on writ of certiorari, with 
Justice Powell delivering the opinion for a 5-4 majority.84 The 
Court first discussed the continuing debate concerning corporal 
punishment, ultimately concluding that despite sharp divisions 
in public opinion "we can discern no trend towards [corporal 
punishment's] elimination. "85 The Court then examined the 
Eighth Amendment's historical origins in the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689,86 where the English sought to prevent the sov-
ereign from committing outrages against the liberties of the 
people.87 According to the Court, the framers of the Constitu-
tion adopted the Eighth Amendment fearing the arbitrary 
imposition of torture and other cruel punishments by judges 
acting beyond their authority, as well as legislatures engaged 
in defining the variety of crimes and punishments.88 
Justice Powell maintained that the Amendment had al-
ways been applied solely to criminal punishments.89 Powell 
distinguished school corporal punishment from the criminal 
punishments protected by the Eighth Amendment, noting that 
"the prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different 
circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal convic-
tion and incarceration."90 A criminal has been deprived of his 
liberty and freedom to be with family and friends, whereas the 
schools are open institutions where children are free to leave 
at the end of the day.91 Even at school, the child is rarely 
apart from teachers and other students who may witness mis-
treatment.92 Further, the common law doctrines holding 
teachers liable for excessive force against their students, pro-
vided adequate protection. "So long as the schools remain 
open to public scrutiny, there is no reason to believe that the 
common law constraints will not effectively remedy and deter 
excesses such as those alleged in this case.,,93 
84. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977). 
85. Id. at 662. 
86. Id. at 664. 
87. Id. 
88. Id at 665 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371-73 (1910». 
89. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 666. 
90. Id. at 669. 
91. Id. at 669-70. 
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Despite the Court's reluctance to "wrench the Eighth 
Amendment from its historical context,,94 and bring school 
paddling within the purview of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause, the imposition of corporal punishment in the 
juvenile court context raises concerns distinguishable from 
those presented by Ingraham. One distinction is obvious: a 
school punishment is a corrective measure usually directed at 
a breach of classroom discipline, at a time when the punish-
ment is closely associated with the offense.95 By contrast, as 
proposed, paddling in juvenile court would follow a formal 
adjudication for an offense.96 
Arguably, a juvenile court proceeding is not a criminal 
proceeding, and thus does not deserve the protection of the 
Eighth Amendment. As section 203 of California's Welfare and 
Institutions Code states, "[a]n order adjudging a minor to be a 
ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a 
crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile 
court be deemed a criminal proceeding.,,97 With increasing 
frequency, however, the juvenile court system has come to 
resemble the adult criminal court system, and this turn must 
be acknowledged by subjecting juvenile court paddling to 
Eighth Amendment review.9s Juvenile courts now focus more 
on the offense in determining the punishment, rather than 
emphasizing what is best for the child, a movement away from 
treatment and towards a system of "just deserts."99 When 
"dispositions" become more akin to punishments, Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny begins to seem more appropriate. 
94. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669. 
95. Gertrude J. Williams, Social Sanctions for Violence against Children: His· 
torical Perspectives, in CORPORAL PuNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (Irwin A. 
Hyman & James H. Wise, eds., 1979) [hereinafter "Hyman & Wise"). 
96. A.B. 150 permitted paddling only after the juvenile has been atljudged a 
ward of the court under section 602 of California's Welfare and Institutions Code. 
Louisiana's H.B. 38 permitted the juvenile court to commit the child to temporary 
custody to execute the paddling, following an atljudication under Articles 897 or 
899 of the Louisiana Children's Code. 
97. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 203 (Deering Supp. 1994). 
98. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punish· 
ment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1988). For 
example, despite California's non·criminal classifications, the California Supreme 
Court has interpreted that section to require Bill of Rights protection for juvenile 
dispositions. See, e.g., Richard M. v. Superior Court, 482 P.2d 664 (Cal. 1970). 
99. Id. at 821·22. 
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Legislative statements of purpose aside, the Ingraham 
Court recognized that some punishments are best character-
ized as criminal, even when classified otherwise. loo In dissent 
in Ingraham, Justice White took an expansive view of the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, finding that a school pun-
ishment is akin to a criminal proceeding because it is an 
institutionalized response to the violation of 
some official rule or regulation proscribing cer-
tain conduct and is imposed for the purpose of 
rehabilitating the offender, deterring the offend-
er and others like him from committing the 
violation in the future, and inflicting some mea-
sure of social retribution for the harm that he 
has done. 101 
Justice White argued that classifying a statute as non-penal 
does not alter the "fundamental nature" of a statute clearly 
penal in nature.102 A statute clearly penal in nature should 
be subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny because the purpose 
of the Eighth Amendment is to protect against excessive pun-
ishment in general, not criminal punishments alone. lo3 
The Court has previously indicated a willingness to review 
the constitutionality of juvenile court proceedings. In In re 
Gault/04 the Supreme Court faced the question of whether 
the protection of the Bill of Rights extended to a child declared 
a delinquent and sentenced to a state school. l05 The child re-
ceived no notice of the proceeding, had no counsel present at 
100. Justice Powell wrote: "Some punishments, though not labeled 'criminal' by 
the State, may be sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments in the circum-
stances in which they are administered to justify application of the Eighth Amend-
ment .... We have no occasion in this case, for example, to consider whether or 
under what circumstances persons involuntarily confined in mental or juvenile 
institutions can claim the protection of the Eighth Amendment." Ingraham, 430 
U.S. at 669 n.37. 
101. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 657, 685-86 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 686-90. Justice White also noted that the openness of the school is 
irrelevant, because openness alone does not confer constitutionality on a punish-
ment which is already suspect. Further, the availability of a tort remedy does not 
necessarily rehabilitate a statute that is constitutionally infirm. This remedy also 
fails to protect the child from abuse ahead of time, instead attempting to remedy 
the situation after the fact. Id. 
104. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
105. 1d. at 4. 
13
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the hearing, and had self-incriminating evidence admitted 
against him. loa Although careful to limit its holding to the 
adjudication hearing itself,107 the Court was willing to con-
cede that at a minimum, juvenile court proceedings must pro-
vide some measure of procedural regularity under the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments. 108 
Although Gault is a landmark case if only for its impact on 
the operation of the juvenile court,109 it does not stand for un-
limited application of the Bill of Rights to juvenile proceed-
ings.110 Gault does, however, lend credence to Justice Fortas' 
notion that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of 
Rights is for adults alone.,,111 As one writer wryly observed, 
Ingraham means that children in school are now "the only 
remaining group of American citizens who may be legally beat-
en.,,112 Advocates of corporal punishment would like to extend 
this dubious distinction to children in juvenile court, relying on 
the non-adversarial nature of the juvenile court process, and 
the broad discretion given juvenile court judges in mandating a 
disposition in the best interests of the child.11s Even the Su-
preme Court, however, has recognized that when a child is 
brought into the juvenile court system, he can at a minimum 
count on some measure of fairness. 114 
IV. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
Although the Supreme Court in Ingraham refused to apply 
106. [d. at 4-8. 
107. [d. at 13. The Court refused to analyze pre-judicial or post-adjudicative 
phases of juvenile justice. [d. 
108. [d. at 27-31. Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, wrote "it would be 
extraordinary if our constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the 
exercise of care implied in the phrase 'due process.' Id. at 27-28. 
109. Feld, supra note 98, at 826. 
110. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 
U.S. 641 (1966) (juvenile has no right to bail, indictment by grand jury, public 
trial or trial by jury). 
111. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. 
112. Cynthia Price Cohen, Beating Children is as American as Apple Pie, HUM. 
RTS. Q. 24, 27 (1978). 
113. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (Deering Supp. 1994). 
114. Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-31. 
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the Eighth Amendment to school discipline,115 the distinc-
tions between school paddling and juvenile court paddling are 
significant enough to review the Eighth Amendment concerns 
raised by such punishment. Because the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the imposition of cruel, degrading punishment, and 
further prohibits punishment excessive in its application and 
disproportionate to the crime committed,116 punishing juve-
nile offenders with the paddle implicates the abuses the Eighth 
Amendment is intended to prohibit. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution states that 
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."117 The 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause has its background in 
the atrocities committed by the Stuart Kings of England, who 
lost their monarchy after the Bloody Assizes of 1685.118 Fol-
lowing the revolution of 1688, William and Mary took the 
crown, and Parliament adopted safeguards designed to protect 
against the abuses of the sovereign.119 The English Declara-
tion of Rights, enacted in 1689, included a provision against 
"'cruell and unusuall Punishments."'12o The phrase also ap-
peared in several American colonial constitutions,121 general-
ly following Virginia's lead.122 During the period when the 
states were debating the Constitution, the fear was often 
115. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977). 
116. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-73 (1975). 
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment was applied to the 
states in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
118. The Bloody Assizes followed the Duke of Monmouth's attempt at revolution 
in 1685. Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys of the King's Bench led a special commission 
which tried, convicted and executed several hundred rebels. Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957, 968 (1991). Some have suggested that the English Declaration of 
Rights is a response to these excesses. See, e.g., Note, What is Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, 24 HARv. L. REV. 54 (1910). Others dispute the role of the Bloody 
Assizes in the formulation of the Cruel and Unusual Clause. Harmelin, 501 U.S. 
at 968. 
119. DAVID HUTCHISON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 317 (2d ed. 
1975). 
120. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-67. 
121. Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" the 
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raised that the new Constitution would not adequately protect 
against torture and abuse.123 By including the Eighth Amend-
ment in the Bill of Rights, the Framers clearly sought to forbid 
barbarous or cruel methods of punishment/24 but their ulti-
mate understanding of the phrase is still a matter of some dis-
pute.125 
No evidence exists to indicate that the Framers intended 
to prohibit corporal punishment against children. As previous-
ly shown, whipping and other forms of corporal punishment 
were a significant part of colonial life. As recently as 1775, the 
same individuals who would soon write the Constitution had 
authorized flogging of sailors aboard Navy vessels.126 Thus, 
under the original meaning of the Constitution, the Eighth 
Amendment would not prohibit the infliction of corporal pun-
ishment in juvenile courts. In a recent speech Justice Scalia, 
addressing the constitutionality of California's proposed As-
sembly Bill 150, said he could foresee no problems with the 
statute, since such punishments were authorized by law at the 
time of the signing of the Constitution.127 Curiously, Justice 
Scalia has previously questioned the viability of any corporal 
punishment statute. In a 1988 speech, he doubted whether 
any federal judge, even an "originalist," would sustain a corpo-
ral punishment regulation such as branding or flogging. 128 
123. 1d. at 841·42. 
124. 1d. at 842. 
125. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967-75. Justice Scalia took pains in Harmelin to 
dispute the notion that by prohibiting "cruel and unusual" punishments, the draft-
ers of the English Declaration of Rights also intended to require some measure of 
proportionality in punishments. But cf. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) 
("The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime is deeply 
rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence."). 
126. NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 65. 
127. Associated Press, Scalia on Caning: it's constitutional, SAN FRANCISCO Ex-
AMINER, Saturday, May 7, 1994, at A2. Justice Scalia's remarks came during a 
speech given at the San Francisco Commonwealth Club. His remarks were neither 
recorded nor transcribed. 
128. Antonin Scalia, OriginaliBm: the Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861-
62 (1989). Originalism, as Justice Scalia has stated, means "that the terms in the 
Constitution must be given the meaning ascribed to them at the time of their 
ratification." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2139 (1993). 
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B. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY 
As Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has developed, the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments has come 
to mean more than just a ban on those punishments restricted 
as cruel or unusual during the time of the framing of the Con-
stitution.129 Instead, the amendment must "draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society."130 The Court has chosen to interpret 
the Amendment in a "flexible and dynamic" manner,131 and 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause "is not fastened to 
the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion be-
comes enlightened by a humane justice."132 Courts must ex-
amine "objective indicia," such as legislative enactments, that 
indicate public attitude on a subject,133 to determine whether 
a punishment is cruel or unusual. 
First among the objective indicators that reflect public 
opinion on an issue are the statutes passed by elected repre-
sentatives.134 No state currently uses corporal punishment to 
sanction juvenile graffiti offenders. The rejection of corporal 
punishment as a remedy for juvenile crimes is reflected in the 
substitution of juvenile court procedures for the earlier system 
of arbitrary punishments and adult treatment of juveniles.135 
The juvenile court system is now predicated upon determining 
what is in the best interests of the child, not merely in choos-
ing between guilt and innocence.136 Juvenile courts aim to 
treat or rehabilitate the child, thereby de-emphasizing punitive 
measures.137 In its statement of legislative purpose for the 
129. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989). 
130. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
131. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S 153, 173 (1976). 
132. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (19lO). 
133. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
134. Id. at 175. 
135. See, e.g., SIMONSEN, supra note 61, at 5-24; BARRY KRISBERG & JAMES F. 
AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 8-27 (1993). 
136. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967). 
137. Id. at 15-16. This observation at first appears inconsistent with the argu-
ment at supra notes 67-114 and the accompanying text, that the criminal nature 
of a juvenile court proceeding requires some measure of constitutional protection. 
But in fact, the Court in Gault recognized that extending some measure of proce-
dure to the process does not diminish the goals of the system. ld. at 21. 
17
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juvenile court system, California expressly states that "[p]un-
ishment, for the purposes of this chapter, does not include 
retribution."138 Instead, the juvenile court must look to the 
best interest of the public and the child, with the goal of reha-
bilitating the juvenile.139 
Another area where legislators have addressed corporal 
punishment is in education. The rejection of corporal punish-
ment in that arena has been steady: at the time of the 
Ingraham decision, in 1977, forty-seven states permitted corpo-
ral punishment of students.14o Today that number has been 
cut in half.141 For example, the California Legislature's decla-
ration of legislative intent preceding its ban on school corporal 
punishment evidences the change in attitude among states: 
"the protection against corporal punishment, which extends to 
other citizens in other walks of life, should include children 
when they are under the control of public schools."142 In Cali-
fornia, introducing corporal punishment into the juvenile court 
would be inconsistent with both the purposes of the juvenile 
court, and with the legislature's desire to protect children from 
corporal punishment. 
Legislative enactments are not the only way to determine 
public opinion on a subject. Polls, surveys and other methods 
of statistical analysis may also reveal public attitudes about 
corporal punishment. According to the National Committee for 
Prevention of Child Abuse, 72 percent of the American public 
believes physical discipline of a child can lead to injury.143 
Ninety percent of those surveyed believe that corporal punish-
138. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (Deering Supp. 1994). 
139. Id. 
140. Hyman & Wise, supra note 95, at 4 (Introduction by Hyman & Wise, eds.). 
14l. See supra, note 68, for a complete list of states currently permitting corpo-
ral punishment. 
142. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49000 (Deering Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). 
143. Anne Cohn, Changing public attitudes on spanking;, THE EXCEPTIONAL 
PARENT, January, 1991, Vol. 21, No.1, at U8. Statistics measuring the support of 
corporal punishment vary. A Harris Poll in 1988 showed 44 percent believed 
teachers had the right to physically discipline students, and 86 percent believed it 
was alright for parents to spank or physically discipline their children. Elizabeth 
Stark, Spare the rod in school, but not at home; Gallup poll of discipline practices, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, December 1989, at 10. 
18
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ment should not occur in schools.144 The trend gleaned from 
these statistics shows that use of physical discipline on chil-
dren is decreasing, with a 13 percent decline in the number of 
parents using physical discipline. 145 Between 1984 and 1994, 
the number of parents who say they approve of giving their 
children a "good hard spanking" fell by 20 percent.146 
The vocal minority who supported Singapore's flogging of 
Michael Fay stand in marked contrast to the majority who do 
not believe in the use of physical punishment to discipline 
children. The California Legislature has stated firmly that 
juvenile punishments are-in theory, at least-not meant to be 
punitive in nature. Further, the legislature has declared its 
opposition to corporal punishment as applied in the education-
al setting. Reinstitution of corporal punishment in the juvenile 
court would countermand both of these legislative pronounce-
ments. As Justice Stewart stated: "A heavy burden rests on 
those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of 
the people."147 
C. EXCESSIVENESS 
Public perceptions of decency are not the end of the 
Court's inquiry, since a penalty must also comport with the 
"dignity of man," a basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment.148 "This means, at least, that the punishment 
may not be excessive.,,149 A determination of excessiveness 
has two elements: first, a punishment must not involve the 
unnecessary or wanton infliction of pain;150 second, the pun-
ishment may not be disproportionate to the severity of the 
144. [d. 
145. [d. 
146. Kathryn Dore Perkins, Parents' Dilemma-to Spank or Not, SACRAMENTO 
BEE, June 5, 1994, at Al. According to a survey by sociologist Murray A. Straus, 
84 percent of parents polled in 1984 said they approved of physical punishment. 
Sixty-seven percent disapproved by 1994. [d. The Supreme Court is reluctant to 
rely on such statistics, however, describing a set of opinion polls opposing the 
application of the death penalty on juveniles a8 resting on "uncertain foundations." 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989). 
147. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976). 
148. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
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crime. lSI An analysis of dis proportionality may be broken 
down into three parts: 1) the gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty; 2) the sentences imposed on other 
criminals in the jurisdiction; 3) the sentences for the same 
crime in other states. 152 
The first inquiry into excessiveness requires courts to 
determine whether the punishment involves "unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain.,,153 Although corporal punishment 
could arguably be applied without severe abuse, finding evi-
dence of excessive use of corporal punishment is not diffi-
cult. l54 In Nelson v. Heyne/55 juvenile inmates at an Indi-
ana correctional institution sued for injunctive relief after 
routine paddling by guards. The Seventh Circuit found sub-
stantial evidence of excessive use of corporal punishment, not-
ing that the practice was easily manipulated by the sadistic, 
lacked formal control, and frustrated correctional and rehabili-
tative goals. 156 The court also noted that corporal punishment 
served no use as a punishment, instead breeding more anger 
and engendering aggression. 157 The court quoted Justice 
Brennan's concurrence in Furman v. Georgia:158 
151. Id. 
The infliction of a severe punishment by the 
State cannot comport with human dignity when 
it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of 
suffering. If there is a significantly less severe 
punishment adequate to achieve the purposes 
for which the punishment is inflicted, the pun-
152. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983). In Harmelin, Justice Scalia 
maintained that Solem was incorrectly reasoned and thus ripe for overturning. He 
rejected Solem's conclusion that the Eighth Amendment guarantees proportionality. 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991). That portion of Justice Scalia's 
opinion, however, was not joined by a majority of the Court, while the Court's 
holding in Solem received a 5·4 majority. 
153. Id. at 173. 
154. In Ingraham, for example, one child was paddled 20 times because he re-
sponded too slowly to a teacher's instructions. He suffered a hematoma that kept 
him out of school for several days. Another child lost the use of his arms for one 
week. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 657 (1976). 
155. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974). 
156. Id. at 356. 
157. Id. at 355. 
158. 408 U.S. 238 (1971) (death penalty applied in arbitrary fashion violates 
Eighth Amendment). 
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ishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore 
excessive.159 
381 
The sight of children bleeding or bruised as a result of 
minor infractions should make it apparent to even the most 
naive supporter of corporal punishment that the practice may 
reach the level of excessiveness simply by frequent and need-
less application. The effort to introduce paddling into the juve-
nile court must address these concerns. Yet recent legislative 
proposals failed to provide courts and judges any standard to 
determine when a paddling should be ordered, the amount of 
force to be applied, or how many strokes a particular crime 
would require. 160 
A punishment may also violate the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition on excessiveness if it is disproportionate to the 
crime committed.16l A punishment is found disproportionate 
by balancing: 1) the severity of the crime and the harshness of 
the punishment; 2) the sentences imposed for the same crime 
throughout the jurisdiction; and 3) the sentences for the same 
crime in other states.162 Paddling a juvenile in open court for 
spray-painting property seems severe, especially in light of the 
current options for sentencing a juvenile graffiti offender. 
California, for example, allows the court to order the offender 
to wash or otherwise repair the property, make restitution, 
perform community service, or serve probation.163 By compar-
ison, Louisiana gives the juvenile court a series of punishment 
options after adjudication of a felony-grade act. 1M These in-
clude reprimand and release, either to parents or foster-par-
ents, probation, commitment to custody of the State Depart-
ment of Public Safety and Corrections, or commitment to a 
public or private reform institution.165 By any measure, pad-
dling is outside the current parameters of juvenile adjudica-
tion. Using those criteria offered in Solem, paddling cannot be 
classified as proportionate to the crime of graffiti. 
159. Nelson, 491 F.2d at 355 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 279). 
160. Other than the requirement that a paddling sentence follow a vandalism 
offense. 
16l. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
162. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983). 
163. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 728 (Deering 1988). 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995
382 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:361 
Perhaps the warning that "[t]he powers of the Star Cham-
ber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile 
courts"166 should give pause to those who seek to include cor-
poral punishment among the dispositions available to the juve-
nile court. Giving juvenile court judges the authority to order 
paddling opens the door to the potential for the arbitrary inflic-
tion of a physically painful and humiliating punishment. Not 
only does paddling frustrate the goals of the juvenile justice 
system, it contradicts legislative intent and public opinion on 
what methods are acceptable to punish children. Finally, the 
introduction of paddling where current punishments are far 
less severe leads to disproportionality between the punishment 
and the crime. 
V. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The substantive due process167 element of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has given rise to the majority of constitutional 
claims related to corporal punishment.168 The Supreme Court 
has recognized that any intrusion into bodily integrity must 
not be procedurally irregular or needlessly severe. 169 As 
Laurence Tribe has explained, needless severity is shown when 
a punishment inflicts pain, causes anxiety of imminent medical 
danger, causes permanent injury, or leads to health riskS.17D 
The risk of violations of bodily security is unquestionably 
raised by the use of corporal punishment in juvenile courts, 
especially in light of recent proposals that offered no guidelines 
as to how harsh or severe the beatings must be.l7l 
The modern doctrine respecting the right to bodily integri-
166. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967) (quoting Dean Roscoe Pound, Foreword 
to YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY (1937». 
167. "[Substantive] due process refers to the principle that a law adversely 
affecting an individual's life, liberty or property is invalid, even though offending 
no specific constitutional prohibition, unless the law serves a legitimate govern-
mental objective." Michael Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals and the Police Power: 
the Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 733 
(1976). 
168. Parkinson, supra note 67, at 281. 
169. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-9 (2d ed. 1988). 
170. ld. 
171. Neither A.B. 150 nor H.B. 38 gave standards or guidelines for juvenile 
courts to use when administering the paddling. 
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ty in the context of a punishment stems from Rochin v. Cali-
fornia. 172 In Rochin, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected 
citizens from unreasonable invasions of bodily integrity. The 
petitioner in Rochin had been at home when the police, learn-
ing of narcotic use at the house, burst into the room where 
Rochin sat.173 He swallowed two pills immediately, but the 
police had his stomach pumped and discovered one of the pills 
contained morphine. Based on that evidence, Rochin was con-
victed and sentenced to sixty days in jail. 174 
The Court overturned his conviction, finding that police 
conduct during the search "shock[ed1 the conscience."175 Jus-
tice Frankfurter wrote that the Court must determine whether 
the proceedings "offend those canons of decency and fairness 
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking people 
even toward those charged with most heinous offenses.,,176 
Sanctioning the conduct of the police in Rochin "would be to 
afford brutality the cloak of law."I77 Rochin established the 
notion that the state has a heavy burden when justifying a 
bodily intrusion. Whether state conduct "shocks the con-
science" thus became the standard by which to measure gov-
ernment invasions into bodily integrity.178 
Ingraham v. Wright recognized that any punishment 
which is directed at a person's physical integrity implicates a 
protected liberty interest. 179 Federal courts have imposed lia-
bility for corporal punishment injuries under substantive due 
process grounds.180 In the leading case on the issue, Hall v. 
Tawney,181 the Fourth Circuit looked to police brutality cas-
172. 342 U.S. 165 (1951). 
173. Id. at 166. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 172. 
176. Id. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412 (1945». 
177. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173. 
178. J. Michael McGuinness & Lisa A. McGuinness Parlagreco, The Re·emer· 
gence of Substantive Due Process as a Constitutional Tort: Theory, Proof and Dam· 
ages, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1129 (1990). 
179. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672·74 (1977). 
180. See, e.g., Thrasher v. General Casualty Co., 732 F. Supp. 966, 970 (W.O. 
Wis. 1990). 
181. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980) (severe paddling of student violated Four· 
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es182 for guidance and carved out a constitutional tort based 
on the application of corporal punishment in the schools. Hall 
established a test adopted by several federal circuit courts 
when faced with claims of excessive brutality in the adminis-
tration of corporal punishment:183 
[T]he substantive due process inquiry in school 
corporal punishment cases must be whether the 
force applied caused injury so severe, was so dis-
proportionate to the need presented, and was so 
inspired by malice or sadism rather than a 
merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it 
amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of 
official power literally shocking to the con-
science. 184 
Before introducing a physical punishment into juvenile 
court, legislators must consider the abuses in the current ap-
plication of corporal punishment. Teachers and school admin-
istrators have consistently gone beyond the pale of authority 
and administered corporal punishment in a manner that 
shocks the conscience. 185 In Hall, the plaintiff allegedlylS6 
was paddled so hard she required emergency room treatment 
and a lO-day hospital stay.lS7 
An especially brutal instance of corporal punishment arose 
in New Mexico, where elementary-school student Teresa Gar-
teenth Amendment guarantee of due process). 
182. 1d. at 613. See, e.g., Rochin, 342 U.S. 165; Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.s. 
432 (1957) (drawing blood sample from unconscious, intoxicated driver does not 
shock the conscience). 
183. See Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1988) (triable issue of fact 
existed where teacher grabbed student from behind and caused student to lose 
consciousness); see aLso Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1987) (sum-
mary judgment inappropriate where teacher slapped student locked in bathroom); 
Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (lOth Cir. 1987) (due process rights violated where 
student beaten severely). 
184. Hall, 621 F.2d at 613. 
185. See, e.g., Brooks v. School Bd. of Richmond, 569 F. Supp. 1534 (E.D. Va. 
1983) (student pierced in the arm with a straight pin); Mott v. Endicott School 
District No. 308, 695 P.2d 1010, 1011 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (student struck in 
testicles). 
186. The accusations were unproven at the time because the case reached the 
Court of Appeal after the district court dismissed the action. Hall, 621 F.2d at 
609. 
187. [d. at 614. 
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cia was paddled after she hit a boy and refused to be listen to 
her teacher.1ss Garcia's teacher held her upside down while 
the school principal struck her with a split paddle. The paddle 
grabbed Garcia's skin each time it struck her, and after five 
beatings Garcia was bleeding, a welt had formed, and the girl 
was left with a permanent scar. 1S9 Garcia was beaten a sec-
ond time for another infraction, suffering bruises so severe on 
her buttocks that a nurse who examined the child said she 
would have called the police if the injury had been received at 
home.19o Evidence of the excessive use of corporal punish-
ment against a juvenile consistently shocks the conscience 
because children are neither emotionally or physically well-
prepared for such treatment. 191 
Federal courts are willing to recognize instances of corpo-
ral punishment that violate "the right to be free of state intru-
sions into realms of personal privacy and bodily security 
through means so brutal, demeaning and harmful as literally 
to shock the conscience of the court. "192 While many courts 
measure the severity of a beating against the type of paddling 
meted out in Ingraham,193 most courts require an egregious 
showing of brutality before accepting a claim of substantive 
due process.194 Substantive due process challenges to school 
corporal punishment thus illustrate the possibility of excessive 
physical abuse that may result when the state punishes juve-
niles by paddling. 
188. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 652 (lOth Cir. 1987) (district court erred in 
granting summary judgment for school district where student injuries sufficiently 
alleged violations of substantive due process). 
189. Id. at 653. 
190. Id. 
191. Corporal punishment impacts children severely "because it is inflicted most 
often upon children who are struggling with a variety of developmental and social 
problems which are related to their self-image." Gertrude M. Bacon & Irwin A. 
Hyman, Brief of the American Psychological Association Task Force on the Rights 
of Children and Youth as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners in the case of 
Ingraham v. Wright, in Hyman & Wise, supra note 95, at 170. 
192. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). 
193. Parkinson, supra note 67, at 287. See, e.g., Garcia, 817 F.2d at 655-56 
(holding that the Hall test and the Ingraham holding together set minimum below 
which corporal punishment does not give rise to constitutional tort). 
194. Parkinson, supra note 67, at 292. 
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VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The final consideration raised by corporal punishment is 
its effectiveness. The possibility of physical and psychological 
scarring of children may thwart, rather than advance, the 
goals of those who seek to solve the problems of juvenile crime. 
Little evidence exists in support of the notion that the correc-
tive aims of the juvenile justice system will be furthered by the 
introduction of purely physical punishments into juvenile 
courts. 195 
After Ingraham was decided, educators and psychologists 
were quick to point out misconceptions about corporal punish-
ment which led to its continuing popularity:196 physical punish-
ments are a traditional method of punishment which teaches self-
discipline; occasional paddling contributes to socialization; 
corporal punishment helps maintain order; and educators favor 
corporal punishment.197 In fact, these ideas have been highly 
disputed, and corporal punishment is regarded by a number of 
social theorists as having a negative overall impact. 198 
Professor Irwin A. Hyman, in his seminal collection Corpo-
ral Punishment in American Education,199 systematically ad-
dressed and debunked each of the assumptions underlying the 
Court's decision in Ingraham v. Wright. While Justice Powell 
assumed that corporal punishment is rarely abused, a survey 
of physical evidence of corporal punishment showed broken 
blood vessels, massive fat emboli, sciatic nerve damage, dam-
age to gluteal muscles, and potential brain damage.2oo Justice 
Powell further assumed that corporal punishment is an effec-
tive form of discipline, yet Professor Hyman relied on data 
from a variety of sources201 indicating corporal punishment 
195. For a detailed discussion advocating the use of more painful punishments 
in general, see GRAEME NEWMAN, JUST AND PAINFUL (1983). 
196. Cohen, supra note 112, at 26. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Hyman & Wise, supra note 95. 
200. Irwin Hyman, A Social Science Analysis of Evidence Cited in Litigation on 
Corporal Punishment in the Schools, in Hyman & Wise, supra note 95, at 394. 
201. These include the American Psychological Association, the National Insti-
tute of Education, and the Center for the Study of Corporal Punishment and AI-
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often results in more aggression, and may be linked to incr-
eased vandalism against schools.202 Finally, Professor Hyman 
pointed out that although the Court could find no evidence of 
the rejection of corporal punishment, the rate of repeal of cor-
poral punishment in schools may indicate a trend away from 
its use and approva1.203 
Professor Hyman' has also demonstrated how corporal 
punishment of children fails to change behavior or teach new 
behavior, and is in fact counterproductive.204 The child who is 
punished violently reacts violently, increasing the likelihood 
that a child will retaliate against other children, teachers, or 
the school building itself.205 Further, states with high rates of 
corporal punishment tend to have high rates of murder com-
mitted by children and violence among students;206 addition-
ally, witnessing and experiencing corporal punishment causes 
children to be more aggressive; and frequent use of spanking is 
linked to lower self-esteem.207 Many organizations have also 
opposed the practice of corporal punishment, as contrary to the 
best interests of the child.20S Despite the warnings, American 
school teachers and principals continue to apply corporal pun-
ishment without measurable success.209 
ternatives. 1d. at 397. 
202. 1d. 
203. 1d. That trend accelerated in the years following the Ingraham decision. At 
the time Hyman wrote, forty-seven states permitted corporal punishment. That 
number has since dropped to only twenty-two. See supra, note 68 for the complete 
list of school's permitting corporal punishment. Hyman's final point, that schools 
are not necessarily the open institutions envisioned by the Court, is only relevant 
insofar as it applies to school punishments, and thus it is not discussed at length 
here. 
204. Interview with Irwin Hyman, Allow Spanking in Schools?, U.S. NEWS AND 
WORLD REPORT, June 2, 1980, at 65. 
205. 1d. 
206. Dana Wilkie, Corporal Punishment for general good? Studies rap the prac-
tice, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, August 22, 1995, at A3. 
207. 1d. 
208. American Medical Association, American Bar Association, National Educa-
tion Association, American Psychological Association, National Parent Teachers 
Association, American Civil Liberties Union, National Mental Health Association, 
Council for Exceptional Children, American Academy of Pediatrics, Society for 
Adolescent Medicine. Collected in Parkinson, supra, note 67, at 279. 
209. Candee Wilde, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, May 6, 1983. A 1983 study 
found that 91 percent of public school principals who administer corporal punish-
ment spank students, while nine percent use some other form of punishment. 1d. 
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Courts have not been blind to the adverse effects of corpo-
ral punishment. In Jackson v. Bishop,210 the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals was presented with a challenge to the prac-
tice of whipping prisoners in an Arkansas penitentiary. The 
court found that the use of corporal punishment "generates 
hate toward the keepers who punish and toward the system 
which permits it. It is degrading to the punisher and the pun-
ished alike. It frustrates correctional and rehabilitative 
goals."211 In Nelson v. Heyne,212 the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals acknowledged that the use of a strap in a boy's insti-
tution "[has] aroused animosity toward the school and substan-
tially frustrated its rehabilitative purpose.,,213 
A countervailing argument in favor of corporal punishment 
relies on the notion that a painful physical punishment gives 
the offender his "just deserts." Retributive theories of corporal 
punishment argue that because the juvenile has engaged in 
wrongful conduct, he deserves a tough punishment for his 
crime, even if the punishment is not necessarily beneficial to 
the child or society.214 Retributive theories, however, should 
be applied cautiously: 
[I]t is exceedingly important to recognize that 
the translation of retributive theories into sen-
tencing policies is both a logical and empirical 
impossibility. Retributive theories cannot and do 
not provide any guidance whatsoever regarding 
either the specific sentence or the range of sen-
tences that equals the just desert of any offend-
er.215 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Educators, psychologists and courts have recognized the 
dangers of applying corporal punishment to children, but the 
210. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). 
211. [d. at 580. 
212. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974). 
213. [d. at 356. 
214. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PuNISHMENTS 51 
(1978). 
215. Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Criminal Law: Prosecuting Juueniles 
in Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. 439 (1985). 
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flogging of Michael Fay clearly touched a chord with the Amer-
ican public. Frustrated over juvenile crime, Americans looked 
to their legislators for a quick, dramatic solution. Solutions to 
juvenile crime are neither quick, nor easy, however. "What 
debate there is on the topic [of juvenile justice] tends to be 
dominated by rhetoric, a remarkable absence of hard facts, and 
politicians advocating for the 'quick fIx' or whatever happens to 
be the most politically expedient.,,216 
Despite a judicial reluctance to seriously evaluate the 
claims of children brutalized in American schools without the 
basic constitutional protection against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, the Bill of Rights is not left at the doors of the juve-
nile court. Only by subjecting juvenile court dispositions to the 
requirements of the Eighth Amendment will children be pro-
tected from the abuse and arbitrary decisions of juvenile court 
judges, the hallmark of a system long abandoned. Further, 
because corporal punishment violates the substantive due 
process rights to bodily security, the Fourteenth Amendment is 
also implicated. Where a punishment is severe, unnecessary, 
and can be said to "shock the conscience," the state has gone 
too far and calls for constitutional redress. 
Finally, corporal punishment raises questions about 
society's goals for juvenile punishment. Instead of sending 
juveniles a harsh message or retribution, juvenile court should 
be an place to teach the child the error of his or her ways and 
thus steer the child in the right direction. Until parents, legis-
lators and educators decide the purpose of juvenile punish-
ment, they will not be able to fully decide which methods serve 
those purposes. 
Scott Bloom' 
216. IRA M. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES 33 (1989). 
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